1.

Introduction
It is commonplace for political scientists and practitioners to refer to time as one of the scarcest commodities in politics (Döring 1995) . The political relevance of decisions on the allocation of time in the decision-making process is comparable, if not sometimes superior, to that of decisions on the content of policies. Suffice to say that a mistake in the timing of a particular decision may undermine its final outcome, whatever its content. Parliaments, in their function of law-makers which collect social demands and try to respond through policies, act in time. For instance, according to analysts, it is really the time pressure exercised by Europe one of the reasons for the rising power of executives at the expense of legislatures in European affairs (for a review on the Europeanization of national legislatures, see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008) . Confronted with the current acceleration of social reality and the proliferation of inputs, both domestic and international, big assemblies struggle to keep the pace. The question of how national parliaments manage their time has never been more pregnant.
Despite its relevance for research on legislatures and law-making, the temporal patterns of legislative processes, namely their unfolding in patterned ways over time, are still poorly This article aims at introducing a new method for the study of temporal trajectories in legislative processes: Sequence Analysis (SA). SA is a primarily descriptive technique which takes whole sequences as the main unit of analysis. 2 The trajectory of a bill, the dependent variable, is formally described as an ordered list of fixed stages which vary in length. In this study, time will not be measured in absolute terms, but relative to overall duration which is standardized to a 100-unit length. For instance, a bill can spend half of its total adoption time on the committee agenda, 25%
on the floor agenda and 25% on other readings. Another may go through the first reading rather quickly (25% of total adoption time) and be stopped for a longer time in other readings (75%). This analysis aims at studying the factors which explains divergence in the patterns of relative time spent at each stage of the process.
This paper is organized as follows. Section two motivates why using a sequential approach offers new insights into the temporal patterns of legislative processes. Section three introduces the employed methodology and describes the data. Section four presents the findings from an exploratory analysis of a sample of legislative acts adopted in Italy between 1987 and 2008. The final section summarizes the findings. tailored for dealing with temporal variation, such as event history analysis, laid the ground for a number of works focusing on the spell length between the presentation of the bill and its final adoption. Mostly, these works treated duration as a proxy for characteristics of the process which are difficult to measure, such as the level of friction surrounding the adoption of bills, namely the resistance to change due to differing political and substantive views present in the process. While these contributions have undoubtedly advanced our knowledge on the time dimension of legislative processes, it is arguable that the relationship between duration and friction is more a matter of empirical analysis than an undisputed assumption (Grzymala-Busse 2010). It might be a correct specification in specific national or policy-specific settings, where time on average is invested in debates and/or scrutiny activities. In other cases, however, duration may be understood as the final sum of many phases, not all of them requiring an active intervention of political actors. Each phase features different rules and actors and, as a consequence, different temporal dynamics. As mentioned above, a hint at the importance of partitioning legislative processes already emerged in the work by Becker and Saalfeld. They observed that "a great deal of time is 'lost' between the different stages […] while bills were 'waiting' to be dealt with by a committee" rather than in actual debate (2004, 74) . In other words, the adoption of a piece of legislation does not stretch itself evenly over time; rather it looks like an irregular stop-and-go process. The number of issues which can fit the agenda of a committee and, even more so, of the plenary is limited at any given time and issues are constantly competing to get the attention of the legislator (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) . Even contentious bills drop sometimes off the legislator's radar and have to queue before being considered. In the meanwhile, time inexorably elapses. The added-value of understanding legislative processes as sequences, namely as a succession of particular states involving different actors and rules, is the possibility to analyse time patterns while not losing sight of the composite nature of our study objects. Legislative processes may be stopped at different stages. An holistic view can help revealing variation in the underlying structure of a bill trajectory.
Important insights on the unfolding of the process over time might come not only from the consideration of the nature and length of the states but by their interdependence. A tenet of SA is that "single events should not be isolated from each other but have to be understood in their continuity" (Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010, 421) . Understanding the duration of each state in a legislative process as independent from the duration of earlier states might be misleading in the case of legislative processes. For instance, previous research on law-making has pointed out that politicians are widely aware of the scarcity of floor time; hence they normally delegate to various offices the power to propose and block proposals to the plenary (Cox 2006) . The creation of offices endowed with special agenda-setting powers and their distribution among majority representatives interested in furthering their interests (which in many cases overlap with those of the majority party/coalition) implies that there exists some form of inter-temporal planning underlying each process. The relative time spent at each stage is not determined randomly, but it is strategically chosen to enhance the probability of bill adoption. For instance, a bill trajectory may be congealed for many months at a specific stage to build a supporting coalition behind it.
Once this is formed, one may witness a relative burst of activity and an acceleration of the process in later stages since major impediments to its adoption were eliminated. As a tool designed to deal with whole processes as units, SA should prove useful to gain new insights on this sort of inter-temporal dependencies. 4 Only as a subsequent step and in light of the regularities revealed by SA one may analyse the causes of particular transitions.
In the end, this work originates from the acknowledgement that elucidating the causal mechanisms underlying law-making requires a greater attention to aspects of temporality. 5 This does not imply that one should forcibly zoom in on specific cases. Neither, it is an invitation to discard regression-based methods such as event history modelling. Rather, it represents an original application of a technique, SA , which -albeit developed and applied in other fields -may represent a useful tool to explore available longitudinal data on law-making activities. To some extent, the introduction of SA to study legislative processes should be considered as "one way to more fully exploit the richness of available longitudinal data" (Aisenbrey and Fasang 2010, 425).
3.
Applying sequence analysis to the study of Italian legislative processes Similarly to individuals, also bills can be said to have their own "life" trajectory within a legislature before becoming laws. They are presented, discussed in different avenues, modified and ultimately adopted. In other words, they undergo a series of transitions which can be traced in time and space. That said, similarities end here and one enters the uncharted territory of defining how to demarcate specific states in an average bill trajectory. Every categorisation has to balance two constraining factors: 1) the capacity to cast light on relevant differences between sequences, while keeping in mind that each sequence should be invariantly a simplification of reality; 2) the availability of data (King 2011).
Defining legislative sequences
The definition of the so-called "sequence alphabet", namely the list of possible states, is a crucial step in SA. One first point to consider is that legislatures are decision-making machines, so the discussion and approval of bills is extensively regulated and not left entirely to the whim of MPs.
Thus, differently from (for instance) career histories, legislative sequences exhibit a fixed order.
Secondly, outlining what is a pivotal event in a legislative process is dependent on research aims.
The main goal of this work is to explain variability in the patterns of relative time spent by each bill at each specific stage of its adoption process, where each step in the decision-making chain is characterised by different actors and institutional requirements. Following a partitioning adopted by Becker and Saalfeld (2004) , the passage of a bill in the first House is decomposed into four institutional states:
 Pre-committee assignment, namely the time spent before the bill is assigned to a committee. The Rules of Procedure of both chambers state that after a bill is formally acknowledged by the assembly, the Speaker of the house assigns it to one of the fourteen standing parliamentary committees. Although this passage should be almost automatic and imply a minimum amount of discretion, it still requires time.
 Pre-committee discussion, namely the time spent before the bill is tabled for discussion in a committee. It is in this very preliminary phase that most of the bills 'get lost', that is they get virtually killed even before discussing them (Krutz 2005) . In most cases, it is the speaker of the committee that has the final word on the committee calendar. Each of these steps is repeated in the Second House. The bill is approved only when both houses agree on the same draft, which implies the possibility of more than two readings. In terms of duration, the most important reading is by far the first with 50 weeks on average (s.d. 53). On average, the second reading lasts less than half as long as the first: 21 weeks (s.d. 25). 485 bills (37%) need three or more readings, which take on average 7 weeks (s.d. 1). 7 These figures suggest focusing the attention only on the composition of the first reading and treat the rest of the time spent in the process as a unique stage. To back this decision, it is also worth mentioning that the highest 'failure hazards' in the Italian legislative process lie in the first reading, with almost 85% of the initiative terminated before approval by the first House. When a bill passes the first reading, it means that there is some degree of political commitment behind it and that it has a high chance of being enacted. This agreement, if necessary, is built during the first reading. Other readings are used to rubber stamp the deal struck in the first house or to sort out divisions among the majorities in the two houses.
In the following, I differentiate between bills adopted in the first reading through the ordinary procedure, i.e. the floor approves them, and bills taking the decentralised procedure, i.e. a committee approves them (sitting in sede legislative). This distinction is required not only by the different format of the alphabet, which is composed of respectively five and four states, but also by substantive reasons. Committees acting in their legislative capacity have played historically a relevant role in securing a swift passage for those laws, mostly of small size and with a microsectional and clientelistic nature, which enjoyed a wide backing among political forces (Di Palma 1976; Kreppel 1997) . 8 In particular, they have favoured log-rolling practices among majority and opposition MPs, which could not have taken place under the spotlight of the floor. Given these peculiar traits, it may be expected that bills adopted in committee follow a different temporal logic with respect to ordinary bills and different factors impact on the relative distribution of time among stages. Descriptive measures of the absolute length of stages are reported in Figure 1 .
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Data
The data used to construct the bill trajectories studied in this work are extracted from the newly created Italian Law-Making Archive (ILMA, Borghetto et al. 2012 ). This archive records, beyond a series of bill-and context-specific attributes, the dates of the main events in the legislative process of every Italian act from 1987 to 2008. 9 For each reading, it reports the date of presentation, the date it was assigned to a committee, the date the committee started its discussion, when the committee ended the discussion and the bill passed to the floor, and when the floor adopted it. The duration of each stage is measured in weeks, since this is the cadence both the committees and the floor set their calendar. Each week spent in a specific state is an element of the sequence. Each sequence is then composed of four/five spells, namely by one or multiple consecutive elements (read weeks) of the same state.
For reasons of comparability, these data were collected only for "ordinary laws". All other types of primary legislation follow fixed (bills converting temporary decrees) or relatively pre-established calendars (budgetary laws), are characterised by supermajority requirements (constitutional laws) or are, for the most part, administrative in nature (laws ratifying international treaties) (these differences are illustrated in Borghetto and Giuliani 2012).
Since the legislative terms under study vary in their duration, we consider only the three legislatures lasting for the whole 5-year mandate (X, XIII and XIV). Legislature XI, XII and XV were all dissolved after approximately two years and were characterised by peculiar political conditions: political turmoil originated by the "Mani Pulite" trials in the early 1990s affected the XI, a caretaker government was in charge for half of the XII, a litigious and narrow majority governed the XV. Table 1 presents an overview of the three legislatures under consideration. press new issues in the parliamentary agenda, though he is aware that the political situation is not ripe for their enactment.
The dependent variable
As already mentioned, the format of legislative sequences differs from standard life course data: Disregarding the different length of processes may be problematic for very short processes, since even short interruptions of parliamentary working due to short holidays or trivial procedural disruptions may affect substantially the pattern of relative durations. This makes them hardly comparable with longer sequences which are less sensitive to the occurrence of this type of events. In order to minimize the effect of these occasional confounding factors, it was decided to drop sequences lasting less than 2 months. 
Method
SA has been primarily about the search for patterns in sequential data. It is essentially an exploratory tool which permits identifying recurring structures in a multitude of sequences differing along several dimensions. In part, it relies on visualization techniques. In part, it makes recourse to data reduction techniques which simplify the information contained in each sequence and, without making any a priori assumption, try to find out how they can be grouped together.
Thus, one of the products of SA is often a dissimilarity matrix, namely a matrix containing the pairwise difference between sequences. . The merits of the debate will not be analysed here. What should be remarked is that there is an agreement in the field that, for the time being, there is no superior heuristic device to extract knowledge from sequential data and that "the use of SA is unlikely to follow a standard procedure, but each time has to be adapted to the data and the research problem at hand" (P. Martin and Wiggins 2011, 403) .
Said that, the peculiarity of my sequences did not justify the recourse to OMA, which is more suitable for sequences differing in terms of order and number of stages. Since we are dealing with vectors and all coordinates/variables are expressed in the same unit, the dissimilarity matrix reports the Euclidean distance between each pair of relative duration vectors.
Based on the dissimilarity matrix, one can cluster together the sequences and, subsequently, analyse the association between cluster membership and a range of variables of interest. The analysis of clusters revealed that a plausible division of my relative duration vectors yields three general groups for both ordinary and decentralised bills. 13 This finding was expected since it reflects the regrouping of sequences based on their prevalent stage. Figure 2 plots each sequence on the vertical axis and its evolution over time on the horizontal axis dividing by cluster and type of procedure. 14 An analysis of clusters reveals that they are characterised by a remarkable heterogeneity of patterns. For instance in Cluster 1-Ordinary Procedure the prevalence of "committee discussion" can vary from 90% to 50%. No clear pattern can be identified in Cluster 3-Ordinary Procedure. This means that a lot of variance from the standard trajectory within each cluster remains unexplained and this simplification can lead to wrong conclusions about the relationship between legislative sequences and covariates. 13 The clustering of bills was carried out using the partitioning around medoids (pam) method. The number of clusters was selected based on the highest average silhouette score (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005), respectively .34 for ordinary bills and .40 for decentralised bills. They were computed using the WeightedCluster R package created by Matthias Studer (2013).
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A solution to this problem has been recently offered by Studer et al. (2011) . They propose a set of methods, which they called discrepancy analysis, allowing studying the relationship between states sequences and explanatory variables without resorting to prior clustering. This method is a generalization of the principles of the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Starting from the information contained in the distance matrix -the pairwise dissimilarities -they create a measure of discrepancy of sequences. 15 Using the share of total discrepancy which is "explained" by one covariate (or more when using a multifactor approach), they measure the "strength" of the relationship. Furthermore, they test its "significance" by means of permutation tests.
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Overall, discrepancy analysis is less assumption-laden with respect to traditional cluster-based analyses. The latter is appropriate for exploratory analyses where intra-cluster variation can be ignored or dealt with as an uninformative error term. On the contrary, discrepancy analysis is well-suited when the research aim is explanatory and the main focus is on the effect of exogenous factors as in this case. Clearly, the trajectories of legislative bills do not respond to an endogenous logic in the same way as humans' decision-making processes. Rather they originate from a complex interaction between diverse actors and conditions. As such, the focus on discrepancy permits to preserve the inter-individual variability of sequences while analysing the relationship between the trajectories and my explanatory factors.
4.
An analysis of temporal patterns in Italian legislative processes
I identified four candidate covariates which are potentially useful in explaining sequence discrepancy in the Italian case. I distinguish first between bills sponsored by the executive and bills sponsored by MPs. Because of the relative executive's greater control over the agenda, the first two stages (pre-committee assignment and pre-committee discussion) should never be prevalent with respect to others. Secondly, I test for the complexity of the bill, measured both in terms of its total length (measured as number of words) and range of affected policy sectors (measured as number of involved committees). From a mechanistic perspective, the expectation is that the intrinsic complexity of a bill should affect the trajectory it takes by involving more directly the committee system: more information has to be collected on what is feasible in a particular policy area and the possible legal and practical implications of its many provisions. Thus, complex bills should be associated with trajectories where committee discussion takes longer than other stages. Fourthly, I consider the impact of the branch of the house where the first reading took place. My expectation is that the higher number of MPs in the Chamber of deputies (630 deputies vs. 315 senators) should be associated with a higher number of bills competing for attention on the agenda, thus a greater likelihood of log jams. Problems of agenda crowding should be particularly apparent at the committee stage, both preceding and during discussion, which should then be dominant in comparison with other stages. In addition to these bill-specific features, the multifactor analysis controls for the legislature where the bill was approved, the prevalent policy sector it belongs to and the number of weeks from the presentation of the bill to the end of the legislature. Table 2 presents the list of covariates, spells out their operationalization and shows selected descriptive statistics.
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As a first step, Figure 3 presents the results from the univariate analysis between the studied trajectories and each of the main covariates. It illustrates the results respectively for ordinary and decentralised processes using sequence regression trees (Studer et al. 2011) . For the binary categorical variables, the procedure simply partition the set of sequences in each category (to simplify the figure, the parent node is not plotted). For the three interval variables, the procedure selects the binary split which yields the highest pseudo-R 2 , namely the split explaining the greatest share of total discrepancy. Within each node of the tree, sequences are visualised as sequence density plots, showing the proportion of legislative processes at each stage for each time point on the x axis (ranging from 1 to 100). Moreover, at the top of each child node it is given the splitting criterion, the node size and the discrepancy s 2 . In addition, each tree figure reports: a pseudo-R 2 , "measuring the share of sequence discrepancy explained by the grouping variable"; a pseudo-F, "to assess the significance of the association"; a Levene statistic, "to test the homogeneity of within-group sequence discrepancies" (Studer et al. 2011, 473).
All the effects are significant (tests were conducted using 5000 permutations), although their strength (indicated by the pseudo-R 2 value) differs. Starting from the effect of sponsorship, it appears that executive bills spend comparatively less time waiting to be scheduled for committee discussion with respect to private bills, irrespective of the procedure in use. This finding seems to support the view that the executive's agenda powers matter at the moment of setting the calendar. As expected, a greater size of the law and a greater number of consulting committees increase the proportion of time spent in committee discussion, while comparatively reducing the pre-committee scheduling stage. In general, complex bills tend to exhibit trajectories where the committee discussion plays a prominent role. The chamber where the bill is examined on its first reading affects more prominently the distribution of time across stages for decentralised bills (pseudo-R 2 = .11). Since these bills are by definition non-controversial, the relatively greater amount of time spent at the committee stage could be imputed to the greater crowding of the chamber of deputies' agenda.
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As a further step, I carried out a multifactor discrepancy analysis, which tests the contribution of each covariate to the total discrepancy reduction, while controlling for other factors. The contribution of a covariate is measured as "the reduction of the between sum of squares that occurs when we drop it from the full model (i.e. from the model with all covariates)" (Studer et al. 2011, 493) . It is measured once again through the pseudo-R 2 value. Table 3 shows the results for the two types of procedure in use in Italian law-making, ordinary and decentralised processes.
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Global F statistics are significant in both models, indicating that we should clearly reject the null hypothesis that my covariates collectively have no effect on the discrepancy of the trajectories.
Overall, the model explains a slightly higher share of discrepancy between sequences when it is applied to decentralised ( = .17.8) rather than ordinary processes ( = . 159). As far as ordinary processes are concerned, the most significant covariate is the size of the law: its removal from the full model leads to a decrease of .045 of the R 2 . As regards decentralised processes, the greatest share of the total discrepancy is explained by the branch where the first reading took place. Dropping it from the full model significantly reduces the pseudo-R 2 by 0.084. In both cases, their raw effects are lower with respect to those estimated in the univariate analysis.
Interestingly, "number of committees" and "time until the end of the legislature", which were highly significant in the univariate model, do not display any significant effect when controlling for other factors. To sum up, if a bill follows the ordinary procedure, its size (a proxy of its complexity)
provides the greatest information about the discrepancy of the trajectories. When it is approved in committee, it is largely a matter of which branch it is introduced first. All in all, these findings further support the decision to deal with the two procedures separately.
Although a multifactor analysis allows assessing the raw effect of each covariate on sequence discrepancy and its significance, it provides little information on the kind of resulting trajectories.
For this reason, Studer et al. (2011) suggest complementing the multifactor approach with a treestructured analysis of sequences. Figure 4a and 4b report the same kind information as the univariate analysis presented in Figure 2 . They differ in that the effect of multiple predictors is accounted for: at each node, starting from the top, the regression tree subdivides the set of sequences on the basis of the binary split predictor which yields the highest pseudo-R 2 . 18 The name and R 2 value associated with this predictor are showed at the bottom of each parent node. Figure 4a and 4b illustrate the branching of the tree respectively for ordinary and decentralised bills. The main advantage of this sort of visualization is that it eases the detection of interaction effects. With regard to ordinary bills (Figure 4a ), the higher share of time spent by bigger laws in committee discussion is mostly accounted for by trajectories of laws in specific fields (economy, welfare and justice) and, within this subset, by laws adopted during the XIII legislature.
Furthermore, as far as bills of smaller size (less than 1038 words) are concerned, their trajectories are conditioned on the time left until the end of the legislature. Whereas for small bills presented in the last two years before an election, time is more equally distributed between first and other readings, Figure 4a shows that bills presented earlier spend a comparatively higher share of time in committee and on the floor. Since we are dealing with very small acts, it is unlikely that such trajectories result from their controversial nature. Rather, they are more likely to be low-salient meaures presented at the beginning of the legislature to increase their hopes of success, which jump on and off the committee agenda during the first reading until they squeeze into the calendar and are eventually adopted. As regards decentralised bills (Figure 4b ), the impact of the branch where the bill is introduced is mediated by the size of the law. Bigger laws require a bigger share of time for discussion in committee, while having to wait less time for being introduced in the committee calendar. Arguably the latter is a result not only of their complexity, but also of their greater saliency. Furthermore, the effect of executive sponsorship is significantly discriminating only the trajectories of smaller acts presented in the senate, thus better specifying the results of the univariate analysis. Finally, the figure reveals that the trajectory of one out of two bills introduced in the chamber of deputies is accounted for by their being small (<= 1755 words) and adopted in the X legislature. This finding substantiates the view that the use of the decentralised procedure underwent an evolution over the study time considered (Kreppel 1997).
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Conclusions
This paper represents a first attempt to study legislative processes as sequences. It was argued that this approach allows analysing temporal patterns while not losing sight of the specificities of each stage. Moreover, the holistic approach of SA helps bringing to light the inter-temporal dependencies between stages.
The empirical section made use of a novel dataset recording all relevant dates in the legislative trajectories of a sample of Italian laws. Each process was segmented into relative time spent by a bill at a specific stage before its adoption. After calculating the pairwise discrepancy (dissimilarity) between legislative sequences, it was studied whether and to what extent a set of inductivelyderived factors could explain variations in the share of observed discrepancy. The analysis relied on both univariate and multifactor tests as well as visualisation tools such as regression tree diagrams.
The predictor explaining the greatest share of discrepancy among ordinary bills' trajectories is the size of the law, which is expected to capture the complexity of the issue addressed by the legislative act. Our analysis reveals that bigger laws are associated with comparatively lengthier examinations by committees. The time employed to analyse the bill and find an agreement at the committee stage saves time in subsequent stages. Interestingly, executive sponsorship is not the most significant covariate. This observation is in line with accounts of Italian legislative politics emphasising the relative weakness of the executive's agenda-setting powers (e.g. Capano and
Giuliani 2001). On the other hand, for bills adopted through a decentralised procedure, the biggest part of the discrepancy of trajectories is explained by the choice of the house where they are presented. Since they are mostly highly consensual but low-salience clientelistic bills, their temporal path is typically determined by their capacity to be accommodated in the crowded committee agenda. In line with our expectation, committee agendas are more congested in the Chamber of Deputies, which due to its higher number of MPs has ordinarily to cope with a greater legislative initiative.
The current analysis constitutes but a first step in the enterprise of gaining a better understanding of temporal patterns in Italian law-making. It makes explicit the presence of multiple ways to get to the same destination (final adoption) and offers some insights into the general mechanisms underlying the various roads. Likewise driving on a big busy highway, it might be a matter of windows of opportunity opening and closing rather unpredictably, of taking the fastest lanes, of setting off at the right moment. The main point of this paper is that, by reducing the complexity of trajectories through SA we can gain a better handle on the flow of traffic in the legislative process and advance more informed hypotheses on the strategies used to regulate it.
The complexity of life course sequences explains the wide application of SA in this study area. Yet, we showed that also its application to fixed-ordered sequences such as legislative processes can be analytically rewarding. In particular, the application of discrepancy analysis offers new means for addressing casual inquiries, thereby going beyond a traditional cluster-based approach. This might be intended as a preliminary demonstration of the possibilities of SA: the increasing Source: Italian Law Making Archive. 1183 ordinary laws with total duration longer than 60 days approved in the X, XIII, XIV legislatures * Interval covariates (number of words, number of committees and total duration of the processes) were discretised into ordinal categories before running the multifactor discrepancy analysis (not mandatory, but recommended, because one does not assume a linear relationship).
Cut-off points were selected through sequence regression trees. They iteratively split the data, based on the split that returns the highest pseudo R 2 at each step. All graphs are available as an online appendix available in the author's website. 
